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TilE MYfH OF SCIENCE AS 
A "NEUTRAL ARBITER" FOR 
TRIGGERING PRECAUTIONS 
VERN R. WALKER* 
Abstract: This article demonstrates that science cannot be a "neutral 
arbiter" for triggering precautionary measures, because both making 
and warranting findings of risk require non-scientific decisions. Making 
a risk finding requires decisions about the meaning of "risk of harm," 
about the meaning of any modifiers for that predicate, and about the 
degree of confidence asserted for the finding as a whole. Determining 
that the available scientific evidence warrants a finding of risk requires 
decisions about acceptable degrees of various types of uncertainty-
namely, conceptual uncertainty, measurement uncertainty, sampling 
uncertainty, modeling uncertainty, and causal uncertainty. This article 
illustrates these decisions using examples from the food safety law of the 
United States, recent animal feed cases in the European Community, 
and Appellate Body decisions in WfO trade disputes. Finding a risk that 
triggers precautions cannot be a purely scientific act, notwithstanding 
the myth that a "value-neutral" science can do so. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is tempting to think that scientists, acting purely as scientists, 
can make the risk determinations that would trigger the taking of 
precautions. If this were true, then perhaps decision-makers could 
remove value-laden politics from the factfinding processes that 
ground the domestic regulation of health and the environment,l the 
invocation of the precautionary principle under treaties,2 and the ad-
judication of international trade disputes.3 Decision-makers could 
* © 2003, Vern R. Walker, Professor of Law, Hofstra University; Ph.D., University of 
Notre Dame, 1975; J.D., Yale University, 1980. The author is grateful for the financial sup-
port proYided by a research grant from Hofstra University. 
I For examples of risk findings concerning food safety, see Section lli.A infm. 
2 For an example involving the precautionary principle of European law, see Section 
III.B infm. For a general discussion of triggering precautionary measures under various 
treaties, see generally James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Prin-
ciple i11 Intcmatioua/Envimmnental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423 (1995). 
3 See, e.g .. discussion infra Section Ill. C. 
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make a clean division between determining whether a risk exists at all 
(risk assessment by scientists), and deciding what actions to take 
about such risks (risk management by governmental decision-
makers). The thesis of this article, however, is that making such a risk 
determination cannot be a matter of "pure science." Although science 
can and should play an essential role in guiding the warranted 
findings about risk that trigger the taking of precautions, such 
factfinding necessarily includes decision-making that cannot be purely 
scientific in nature. At least in the most important cases, it is a myth 
that science can be a "neutral arbiter" for triggering precautionary 
measures. My argument has two dimensions. The first concerns the 
logical structure of the risk findings. The triggering finding requires 
decisions that cannot be "purely scientific." This means that when 
lawmakers define the factual predicate for taking precautions, non-
scientific decisions are necessary. It also means that when factfinders 
identify risks, or make a finding that the legal trigger for taking precau-
tions has been satisfied, non-scientific decisions are also necessarily 
involved. In theory, it is conceivable that when lawmakers establish 
the wording of the relevant finding, they could use terms that have no 
uncertainty as to their meaning, and factfinding using those words 
could be a ministerial task. In practice, however, quite the opposite is 
true: lawmakers often use vague terms, and finding that the legal trig-
ger about risk has been met requires decision-making that cannot be 
purely scientific.4 Unfortunately, lawmakers and factfinders often 
mask non-scientific decisions in language that sounds scientific. 
The second dimension of my argument concerns the logical rela-
tionship between available scientific evidence and findings of risk. In-
herent in the evidentiary warrant for the finding are scientific UIICer-
tainties, which require decisions about acceptability that cannot be 
"purely scientific." Deciding that a particular finding about the risk is 
warranted, given the evidence, cannot be a policy-neutral determina-
tion. Once again, factfinders, and even scientists, sometimes mask 
those non-scientific decisions about warrant in language that sounds 
scientific. 
It is a myth, therefore, to think that science can be a "neutral ar-
biter" for triggering precautions. Moreover, risk assessment, defined 
as the process of reaching warranted findings about risk on the basis 
of scientific evidence, cannot be purely scientific or policy-neutral. 
This article develops this thesis in three parts. The first section of the 
4 For examples of vague formulations in use today, see infra Section III. 
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article discusses the logical structure of a finding about risk, and ana-
lyzes the logical elements of such a finding. The second section sur-
veys the types of scientific uncertainty that are logically inherent in 
any inferences from empirical evidence to risk findings. The third sec-
tion illustrates the way in which these logical elements and scientific 
uncertainties underlie legal language that often sounds scientific. The 
illustrations come from the food safety law of the United States, the 
animal feed law of the European Community, and the health and 
safety provisions of a treaty administered by the World Trade Organi-
zation (vVTO). The variety displayed in these disparate legal areas 
emphasizes the logical basis of my thesis. Because my analysis is 
grounded in logic-that is, in the meaning of the risk finding itself 
and in the nature of its scientific warrant-the conclusion is inescap-
able that war ran ted risk findings used to justify the taking of precau-
tions cannot be purely scientific. 
I. NoN-SCIENTIFIC DEciSIONs INHERENT IN THE LoGICAL STRUCTURE 
OF FINDINGS ABOUT RISK 
The first dimension of my thesis is the logical structure of the 
findings about risk. When lawmakers establish the wording for such a 
finding, they encounter a number of decisions that are not "purely 
scientific." Moreover, when lawmakers use words that are necessarily 
or conveniently vague in their meaning, factfinders must make non-
scientific decisions when they find that the legally required trigger for 
taking precautions has been met. The semantic structure of such 
findings about risk reflects those decisions. A finding of risk is some 
variant of the proposition "there exists a risk of harm." It is an asser-
tion that has three logical elements: (1) a categorical predicate (ex-
pressed in this example by the noun phrase "risk of harm"); (2) a 
modifier of the predicate (in this example, the indefinite article "a"); 
and (3) the modality or degree of confidence in the truth of the 
proposition as a whole (here, expressed in part by the indicative verb 
"exists"). I will briefly discuss each logical element in turn. 
First, the finding about risk must employ some categorical predi-
cate, which the factfinder will use to classify any particular situation 
under consideration. Precautions are taken, in the face of risk, in an 
effort to prevent some harm from occurring. In this general analysis, 
"harm" can mean any adverse event. VVhat is considered as "adverse" 
usually involves an evaluation that is not entirely scientific. Scientists 
might be able to determine which conditions are harmful to a par-
ticular organism or ecosystem if "harm" means clear biological dys-
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function. The matter becomes more complicated, however, if what 
counts as "harm" or "adverse" requires evaluation and balancing of 
psychological, economic, or aesthetic effects. If "harm" connotes a net 
loss when weighed against benefits, there may be no consensus on 
what to value or count as a benefit, or on acceptable trade-offs. In 
such a case, "harm" is no longer a term with a scientific definition. 
Moreover, if "harm" is a matter of degree, then deciding what consti-
tutes a legally recognized "harm" requires establishing a threshold on 
a scale of degree-for example, a threshold of air or water quality 
short of clear toxicity. A definition of the kind and degree of "harm" 
that should trigger precautionary measures is necessarily a balancing 
of risks and benefits under the circumstances, which is beyond the 
domain of pure science. Thus, if lawmakers simply employ a vague 
term such as "harm" in the legal definition of the required finding 
about risk, then they have passed on to factfinders the non-scientific 
task of deciding what to count as "harm" for legal purposes. 
A similar analysis applies to the meaning of "risk" in the categori-
cal predicate, which can connote either the possibility of a harmful 
event or some measure (probability) of the likelihood that the harm 
will occur.5 While the "harm" refers to the adverse end-state, the c<;>n-
cept of "risk" connotes a causal chain of events leading to that end-
state. A chain of events denoted as "a risk" could begin with the 
speaker's situation ("I am at risk for lung cancer") or action ("by 
smoking cigarettes I am taking a risk of developing lung cancer"), or 
could begin with any other situation or action ("releasing this geneti-
cally modified organism into the environment is creating a risk of eco-
logical harm"). Such event-chains can be either direct or indirect 
(mediated by other events), and intervening events can be known or 
unknown. The causal links between events might be described either 
qualitatively or quantitatively. If a causal link is described qualitatively, 
then the speaker is asserting only that the causal chain of events is a 
possible one. For example, "cigarette smoking increases the risk of 
lung cancer" asserts that there exists at least one causal chain that 
leads from smoking cigarettes to developing lung cancer, a causal 
chain that is not a possibility in the absence of cigarette smoking. The 
intervening causal mechanisms may not be known, but there can be 
5 See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF TilE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1660 (2d ed. 
1987) (defining "risk" as "exposure to the chance of injury or loss"); WEBSTER's NIN'IH 
NEw CoLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1018 (1991) (defining "risk" as "possibility of loss or in-
jury"); OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (defining "risk" as "exposure to mischance 
or peril"), at http:/ /www.oed.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2003). 
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good evidence of the causal link nonetheless. A causal link might also 
be described quantitatively. For example, the speaker might assign a 
conditional probability to the likelihood of occurrence-such as a 0.3 
probability of the harm occurring ("H") if the action ("A") is taken 
(in symbols, "Prob(H lA) = 0.3"). These are all logical options for how 
lawmakers might define a triggering "risk." 
Finding a qualifYing "risk of harm," therefore, combines a deci-
sion about what constitutes a "harm" with an assertion about the pos-
sibility or likelihood of causal chains resulting in that harm. Science 
certainly has a critical role to play in identifying and, if possible, quan-
tifYing those causal chains. But in the legal context of triggering pre-
cautions against harm, the word "risk" generally means a particular 
level or degree of risk that should trigger the taking of precautionary 
measures. Selecting the triggering level of risk requires a balancing of 
values, i.e., a weighing of the costs of precaution against the costs of 
risk-taking. This is clearly the case when risk is measured quantita-
tively, and there is some notion of de minimis risk-that is, some prob-
ability of occurrence that is so low that it is "not considered a risk at 
all" in the relevant legal context. When lawmakers establish that a 
threshold of risk must be cleared before precautions are triggered, 
this decision is not scientific. When lawmakers simply employ the 
word "risk" to formulate the legally required trigger, then they have 
passed on to factfinders the non-scientific task of deciding what to 
count as a qualifying "risk." 
Second, a statement or finding of trigger for taking precautions 
also may involve, implicitly or explicitly, a modifier for the categorical 
predicate. Sometimes the selection of a modifier simply reinforces the 
notion that there is a risk threshold below which the precautions are 
not triggered. For example, the statement of trigger might specifY that 
only a "serious" or "substantial" risk of harm should trigger the pre-
cautions. In other cases, the statement of trigger might refer to "a" 
risk, or even "any" risk. In such situations, a fair reading of the re-
quirement might be that any possible chain of events leading to a 
relevant harm is sufficient to trigger precautions. Thus, lawmakers 
might insert either a qualitative or quantitative modifier for the cate-
gorical predicate. In the absence of linguistic signals prohibiting the 
practice, factfinders might infer an implicit modifier. For example, 
they might decide that a risk of harm is so remote or so trivial that it is 
not a "real" risk at all-at least for purposes of taking the precautions 
at issue in the legal context. Regardless of which modifier lawmakers 
select for the legal standard, the selection itself clearly is not a sci-
entific decision. Moreover, if the selected modifier is vague, or calls 
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for some balancing of multiple factors, then deciding whether it is 
met in a particular case cannot be a purely scientific decision. For ex-
ample, it is not a scientific matter to decide whether a risk is "serious" 
or "substantial" enough to trigger precautionary action. 
Third, any finding explicitly or implicitly involves a degree of 
confidence in how likely it is to be true. This might be expressed sim-
ply in the grammatical mood of the verb used. The indicative and sub-
junctive moods in English express many variations. For example, a 
finding can assert that a risk of harm "does exist," or "might exist," 
''would exist," or "could exist." Logicians sometimes describe modali-
ties as ranging from the (necessarily) false, through degrees of im-
probability, past a region of equipoise (as likely as not), through the 
increasingly probable, to the (necessarily) true.6 Examples of English 
expressions marking points along that range include "merely possi-
ble," "somewhat likely," and "highly probable." Lawmakers can decide 
to require any particular modality or degree of confidence before 
precautions are triggered. Moreover, they can match any particular 
risk of harm with any degree of confidence. For example, they might 
require precautions if a factfinder finds a "substantial risk of cancer" 
to be merely "possible," indicating some low level of confidence in the 
finding. By contrast, lawmakers might intend to trigger precautions if 
"some risk of any harm" has a "high likelihood of being true," indicat-
ing that the factfinder should be quite sure that some risk exists, al-
though that risk might be fairly minor in nature. 
The selection of which modality to include in the trigger clearly 
is not a scientific matter. The degree of confidence that is appropriate 
for triggering precautions depends upon a prudential balancing of 
the risks and benefits in the situation. It is not an issue for scientists 
alone to determine. Nor is it a purely scientific matter to determine 
whether the selected modality is satisfied in the particular case, as 
long as the relevant modality is not a purely scientific concept. For 
example, if the statement of trigger contains the modality "highly 
likely," then deciding what counts as "highly likely" is not a purely sci-
entific matter. What should count as a "high" likelihood for purposes 
of risk taking is not a purely scientific question, and vague, imprecise 
terms do not become scientific simply because scientists are willing to 
6 For discussions of modal logic, see, e.g., CLARENCE I. LEWIS & CooPER H. LANGFORD, 
SYMBOLIC LOGIC 153-66, 199-234 (2d ed. 1959); GERALD j. MASSEY, UNDERSTANDING 
SYMBOLIC LOGIC 163-222 (1970); MARK SAINSBURY, LOGICAL FORMS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 13-19, 220-90 (1991). 
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use them. Even if the evidence warranted assigning mathematical 
probabilities to various risks, there still would be the question of what 
should count as "highly likely"-probabilities of at least 0.7, or 0.85, 
or only 0.9? Perhaps this is better illustrated on the low end of the 
probability spectrum. If precautions are not triggered unless risks are 
"more than merely speculative," surely it is not a scientific task to de-
cide the meaning of this standard, or the degree of confidence 
needed to satisfY it. Statutes and regulations hardly ever define de-
grees of confidence in such a way that they become precise, scientific 
concepts. 
This analysis applies to any triggering finding of risk. No matter 
what the specific statement of trigger is, it must implicitly or explicitly 
involve decisions about the meaning of the categorical predicate 
(such as "risk of harm"), about the meaning of any modifiers for the 
categorical predicate, and about the modality of the triggering propo-
sition as a whole. When lawmakers make these decisions in formulat-
ing the legal statement of the triggering risk, they balance principles, 
policies, and the desirability of possible consequences. When enacted 
statements of trigger include words that are vague in meaning, then 
finding that any particular situation satisfies that trigger cannot be a 
matter for pure science. Such statements of triggering conditions 
simply push the non-scientific decision-making onto the factfinder, in 
the context of the particular case. Section III of this article contains 
examples of such vague statements of triggering risk. 
II. NoN-sCIENTIFIC DECISIONS INHERENT IN THE SciENTIFIC 
WARRANT FOR fiNDINGS ABOUT RISK 
The previous section analyzed the logical structure of any state-
ment that a triggering risk exists-either the kind of statement that a 
lawmaker might use to legislate the conditions for triggering precau-
tionary measures, or the kind of statement that a factfinder might as-
sert in finding those conditions to be satisfied in a particular case. In 
this section, I argue that when a factfinder concludes that the evi-
dence warrants a finding of risk, this act necessarily involves non-
scientific decision-making. This argument is logical in nature because 
it rests on showing that even scientific evidence about causation, of 
the kind used to warrant a finding of risk, necessarily involves several 
distinct types of uncertainty. Scientists sometimes can reduce the lev-
els of such uncertainties, but they can never eliminate those uncer-
tainties altogether. 
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In reaching a conclusion that empirical evidence warrants the 
proposition that "events of kind A can cause events of kind B," a rea-
sonable person must decide, with respect to various types of lmcer-
tainty, what level of uncertainty is acceptable. Decisions about the ac-
ceptability of different levels of uncertainty-while they are often 
made by scientists, either ad hoc or by convention-are not them-
selves purely scientific decisions. They are pragmatic in nature and 
usually context-dependent. This section therefore provides the sec-
ond dimension of my argument: any determination that the available 
scientific evidence warrants the triggering finding of risk necessarily 
involves non-scientific decision-making. In practice, these decisions 
may take the form of rules or findings about the acceptable methodo-
logical quality of the supporting evidence, the required specificity of 
the evidence, or the minimum sufficiency of the total amount of evi-
dence. Such rules or findings reflect non-scientific decisions about 
when it is desirable to take precautions in the face of uncertainty 
about causation. 
A. Five Types of Scientific Uncertainty in Warranting Risk Determinations 
Empirical scientific evidence warranting any finding of risk in-
volves at least five logically distinct types of scientific uncertainty: con-
ceptual uncertainty, measurement uncertainty, sampling uncertainty, 
modeling uncertainty, and causal uncertainty.7 "Uncertainty" here 
means a potential for error in drawing an inference. Each type of un-
certainty arises at a distinct step in the scientific method for warrant-
ing a finding about causation. Mter the process of scientific proof is 
complete, a residual degree of uncertainty of each type is inherent in 
the warrant for the finding. The argument here is that these types are 
logically distinct, generally cumulative, and probably inherent in 
every important finding of a triggering risk. New evidence or data 
might reduce the amount of uncertainty of one type or another, but 
new evidence generally cannot eliminate altogether any of these types 
of uncertainty-at least not for any finding of risk that plays an impor-
tant role in triggering precautions. 
7 For a more detailed treatment of these five types, see Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs 
of Science: Toward a Taxonomy of Scientific Uncertainty for Decision makers, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 567, 
57~18 (1991) [hereinafter Walker, Siren Songs]. 
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1. Conceptual Uncertainty 
Any time scientists select particular events to study and particular 
concepts to use in describing those events, they place a conceptual 
structure on the world and frame the way that they gather informa-
tion about those events. For example, the proposition "inhaling air 
containing high concentrations of benzene can cause leukemia in 
people" asserts a causal relationship between certain inhalation events 
and the development of leukemia. That statement does not refer to 
other potentially causal factors-for example, genetic, developmental, 
or environmental factors. Moreover, scientific investigators could de-
scribe the same real-world events in an indefinite number of ways, us-
ing an indefinite number of variables. An event in a person's life is 
not merely a benzene exposure. It can have many exposure-
descriptions (for example, "spending time within 100 meters of a 
high-voltage electricity transmission line"), and it can be part oflarger 
processes (for example, "living in Denver"). 
Within the context of science, there are very few constraints on 
inventing scientific variables and using them as classification catego-
ries. Scientists select variables they hope will produce measurements 
(data) that will prove predictive and explanatory.8 Such hypotheses 
generally extend past work into new areas. But decisions about what 
to study and how to study it are always made in a pragmatic context. 
Funding agencies have their own missions, priorities, and preferred 
methods. Editors of professional journals and their peer reviewers 
have their own views about what kinds of research are likely to be 
valuable. Moreover, scientific investigators sometimes design their 
studies to be instrumental to risk managers, who operate under statu-
tory and political mandates, with settled policies on what counts as an 
adverse effect or a permissible precautionary measure. Such contexts 
undoubtedly influence which variables investigators choose to study. 
However, once investigators select their study variables and gather 
data using those variables, then any causal conclusions drawn from 
the study are open to question about whether different or additional 
variables would have produced different results. The selection of vari-
ables can result not only in a lack of knowledge about the variables 
not studied, but also in inferential error about those variables that are 
8 For discussions of types of measurement variables, see, e.g., EDWIN E. GHISELLI, ET 
AL., MEASUREMENT THEORY FOR "11IE BEHAVIORAL SciENCES ( 1981); HERMAN j. LoETIIER & 
DoNALil G. 1\lcTA\"ISII, DESCRIP'IlVE AND INHRENTIAL STA"IlSTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 16-
24 (4th ed. 1993). 
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studied.9 The uncertainty created by the selection of variables is what I 
have called "conceptual uncertainty." Conceptual uncertainty is the 
potential for error created by using particular variables to describe 
and study the world. As long as scientific resources and funding are 
limited, deciding which variables deserve to be studied next is not 
merely a scientific question, but also reflects decisions about societal 
needs and values. 
2. Measurement Uncertainty 
Measurement is the process of classifying individual objects or 
events into the categories of a variable-that is, the process of gener-
ating the data for a scientific study. Measuring individual objects or 
events incurs the possibility of ]llisclassification. Scientists usually di-
vide measurement uncertainty into two kinds of problems: reliability 
and validity. A measurement process (as well as the resulting data) is 
said to be "unreliable" to the extent that repeated measurements of 
the same object or event by the same measurement process would 
yield inconsistent results in a random fashion. 10 If a researcher meas-
ured or classified the same individual repeatedly, using an unreliable 
process, the individual would score differently under the variable and 
in a random pattern. For example, repeat analyses of the same air 
sample might yield different concentrations of benzene in parts per 
million, but all those results might fall in a random pattern and 
largely within one percent of the mean value. For many measurement 
processes, especially in the physical sciences, reliability studies can 
determine distributions of error under different sets of circum-
stances. Reducing the range of random variation in measurements 
increases the "precision" of the measurements. 11 In the behavioral 
sciences, however, the feasibility of re-testing the same individual is 
especially difficult, since the measurement process itself might change 
the behavior of the test subject. Re-taking psychological tests, for ex-
ample, might produce higher scores simply because taking tests im-
proves the individual's test-taking skills. Despite such methodological 
problems with certain types of subjects and variables, scientists still 
employ a fairly clear notion of measurement unreliability, in which 
9 See discussion of causal uncertainty, infra Section II.A.5. 
10 See, e.g., EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
AssESSMENT 11-13 (John L. Sullivan ed., 1979); GmsELLI ET AL., supra note 8, at 184, 191. 
11 See, e.g., Theodore Peters, Jr. & James 0. Westgard, Evaluation of Methods, in TEXT-
BOOK OF CLINICAL CHEMIS"ffiY 410, 412 (Norbert W. Tietz ed., 1986). 
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the error is due to random variations in the measurement process it-
self. 
Using a perfectly reliable measurement process that yields exactly 
the same measurement score for the same individual every time the 
process is repeated still could leave uncertainty about the "validity" of 
the measurement. A measurement process is valid to the extent that it 
measures exactly what it is thought to measure.J2 Measurement proc-
esses are invalid when they place an individual object or event in the 
wrong category of the variable, even if they do so repeatedly and con-
sistently. Validity problems raise external questions about the "accu-
racy" of the measurement process, as determined by alternative 
measures of the same variableP If, for example, a "criterion method" 
or "reference method" exists that serves as a standard for measuring 
benzene in air, then a new technology or process for measuring the 
same variable would be tested for validity against the criterion 
method. 14 To the extent that the new measurement process produces 
biased data or systematic error, as compared to the results obtained by 
the criterion method, then there is a validity problem. 
While reliability is a matter of internal consistency (using the 
same method on the same subject), validity is a matter of external 
consistency (different methods but the same subjects). Both kinds of 
measurement uncertainty are about the measurement process, not 
about true variations in the individual objects or events being meas-
ured. Moreover, both kinds of measurement uncertainty require deci-
sions about the level of uncertainty that is acceptable in factfinding. 
Because every measurement process is to some extent unreliable, the 
factfinder must decide upon the level of "acceptable imprecision." 
Because it is usually possible to question the degree of invalidity in-
volved in a measurement process, the factfinder must decide upon 
the level of "acceptable inaccuracy." The acceptable imprecision and 
inaccuracy for a space shuttle launch are likely to be different than 
what is acceptable for flying commercial aircraft or for driving a car. 
Factfinding about the risk that ought to trigger the taking of precau-
tions likewise varies from case to case. Therefore, finding that the 
12 Sec, e.g., CARMINES & ZELLER, supra note 10, at 12-13; GHISELLI ET AL., supra note 8, 
at 266. 
13 Peters & Westgard, supra note 11, at 412; David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Refer-
ence Guide 011 Statistics, in FEDERAL juDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SciENTIHC 
EVIDENCE 83, 103-04 (2d ed. 2000). 
14 See, e.g., Peters & Westgard, supra note 11, at 412; Kaye & Freedman, supra note 13, 
at 104. 
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measurement uncertainty in a risk determination is within acceptable 
bounds is not a purely scientific decision. 
3. Sampling Uncertainty 
Scientific data record actual measurements taken on particular 
objects or events. Scientists often want to generalize beyond the past 
measurements, however, and they warrant generalizations about ob-
jects or events as yet unmeasured. Scientists distinguish between the 
"sample" (the individuals actually measured, or the data gathered 
from measuring them) and the "population" (the group that is the 
subject of the generalization). Making an inference from sample data 
to a conclusion about the population creates the possibility that error 
will be introduced because the sample does not adequately represent 
that population. Whether a generalization is warranted depends in 
part upon the nature of the relevant variable and the nature of the 
individual objects or events studied. For example, the results of an 
occupational health study might warrant generalization to the general 
population because the biological processes being studied are fairly 
uniform among people. On the other hand, a worker sample might 
contain an unrepresentative proportion of healthy subjects, relative to 
the general population. This could create a "healthy worker" bias in 
an inference from sample results to the general population. 
Scientists prefer to warrant a generalization by the manner in 
which they draw the sample and analyze the data. If possible, they 
draw the sample in such a way that they can warrant assigning a prob-
ability distribution to all possible samples and statistical results.l5 For 
example, if the population contains 50% men and 50% women, then 
there is a certain probability of randomly drawing a sample of 200 
people in which there would be 102 men and 98 women. Drawing a 
scientific or probability sample allows scientists to calculate the 
mathematical probability of drawing a particular type of sample from 
a particular type of population. Once a scientific sample has been 
drawn and those probabilities have been calculated, the sample re-
sults can help warrant conclusions about the population itself. For 
example, suppose a probability sample of 200 people, drawn from a 
population with an unknown proportion of men and women, con-
tains 150 men and only 50 women. The hypothesis that the popula-
tion contains 50% men and 50% women might be implausible given 
!5 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS 224-25 (5th ed. 1994). 
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this sample. The probability of drawing such a sample from such a 
population may be extremely low-so low that a scientist would con-
clude that this hypothesis about the make-up of the population is 
probably false. The warrant for rejecting this hypothesis as improb-
able rests on the way the sample was drawn, on the actual sample re-
sults, and on probability theory itself. 
Statisticians have invented various techniques for warranting in-
ferences about the population on the basis of a probability sample. 
These techniques include hypothesis testing using P-values, 
confidence intervals, and statistical power.16 These techniques charac-
terize the extent of the sampling uncertainty inherent in any infer-
ences from sample to population. They help characterize the poten-
tial for error that is created by the fact that the empirical evidence is 
limited to sample data. Such techniques cannot eliminate the possibil-
ity of sampling error, but they can aid in characterizing the degree of 
sampling uncertainty involved in a generalization. Ultimately, how-
ever, every reasonable factfinder must decide what degree of sampling 
uncertainty is acceptable. For example, one convention among scien-
tists is to consider "statistical significance at the 0.05 level" as accept-
able for rejecting an hypothesis about a population.'7 Such a conven-
tio~l reflects decision-making among scientists, but is not itself a 
scientific conclusion. Selecting the level of sampling uncertainty that 
is acceptable for precautionary purposes is not a purely scientific de-
CISion. 
4. Modeling Uncertainty 
Measurement and sampling uncertainty exist even for data gath-
ered on a single variable. However, generalizations about risk rest 
upon causal relationships among multiple variables. Scientists use 
mathematical models to predict values for some variables based on 
values for other variables. Two important examples of such mathe-
matical models in risk determinations are relative risk and linear re-
gression models. 18 Epidemiologists and public health officials often 
16 Sec, e.g., K.""tye & Freedman, supra note 13, at 373-93. 
17 Sec, e.g., CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF Sci-
ENCE AND 11IE LAW 29-48 (1993); Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persua-
sion in a ll'clrld of Impc!fcct Knowledge, 60 N.Y. U. L. REv. 385, 409-17 ( 1985); Michael Cowles 
& Caroline Da\·is, On the Origins of the .05 Level of Statistical Significance, 37 AM. PsYCHOLO-
GIST 553 ( 1982); HAYs, supra note 15, at 267-82, 302-03. 
18 Walker, Siren Songs, supra note 7, at 598-608 (linear regression model); Vern R. 
Walker, The Concept of Baseline Risk in Tort Litigation, 80 KY. LJ. 631, 651-62 (1992) (relative 
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use relative risk to characterize or predict the excess risk of popula-
tions exposed to a hazard. 19 Toxicologists and exposure modelers of-
ten use linear regression models to characterize the incremental con-
tributions of multiple hazards (e.g., asbestos exposure and cigarette 
smoking) to the total risk of an adverse effect (e.g., lung cancer). Sci-
entists use a variety of mathematical models to characterize the quan-
titative relationships among multiple variables. 
Even a very simple mathematical model will illustrate the nature 
of the uncertainty that use of such models introduces. For example, if 
a particular clock "runs fast," we can still use it to determine the time 
of day if we use the right mathematical model. If the watch gains ap-
proximately two minutes per hour, then one model might be to mul-
tiply two minutes times the number of hours since the clock was last 
set, and subtract that product from the time shown on the clock. Such 
a model creates uncertainty in two ways. First, using a different ad-
justment parameter or "constant" in the formula might yield better 
results (e.g., llO seconds instead of two minutes). Second, using a dif-
ferent formula might be more accurate (e.g., multiplying the dura-
tion of the previous hourly cycle by 1.02, instead of adding a constant 
value for each passing hour). Using different parameters or different 
model formulae will produce different predictions, with different lev-
els of precision and accuracy. Such uncertainties are similar to the 
issues of reliability and validity discussed above under measurement 
uncertainty. When the evidence of risk involves mathematical models, 
the factfinder faces similar decisions about what levels of model reli-
ability and validity are acceptable in particular contexts. These deci-
sions are not purely scientific, but instead require judgments about 
what potential for error is acceptable given what is at stake. 
5. Causal Uncertainty 
Even when measurement, sampling, and modeling uncertainties 
are acceptable, and the evidence warrants that there are probably 
quantitative associations among events in the real world, an additional 
potential for error still exists in interpreting the underlying causation 
that explains such associations. Warranted mathematical models can 
risk model); see Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide 071 Epidemiology, in FEDERAL juDI-
CIAL CENTER, supra note 13, at 348-54 (relative risk and odds ratio in epidemiologic stud-
ies); David L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide 071 Multiple Regression, in FEDERAL juDICIAL CEN-
TER, supra note 13, at 179-227. 
19 See, e.g., Green et al., supra note 18, at 348-54. 
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predict events based on other events, but causal relationships are 
needed to explain why those events occur. Two types of events can 
occur or vary together without one causing the other. For example, 
barometric changes do not cause weather patterns, and clinical symp-
toms do not usually cause the disease. Even if there exists a real statis-
tical association between events of type A and events of type B, there 
are numerous causal possibilities: A might cause B; B might cause A; A 
and B might interact in complicated ways; other types of events might 
cause both A and B; and so on. One result of conceptual uncertainty 
(gathering data only on certain variables and not on others) may be 
that the truly explanatory variables are ignored and the resulting 
causal theories are inaccurate.20 The causal account of the statistical 
association may remain largely unknown. 
On the other hand, even if there is some evidence that no statis-
tical association exists between two types of events, those events might 
still be related causally. For example, some unstudied event might 
counteract or mask the causal action.21 The complexities of human 
metabolism often make it very difficult to determine causal patterns 
within the human body. The same is true of complex ecosystems. A 
controlled experiment might manipulate some suspected causal fac-
tors in such a way that it unmasks a causal influence, but controlled 
experiments are not always feasible. For ethical, methodological, and 
economic reasons, the best available evidence is often epidemiologi-
cal or the product of field studies; thus, the resulting conclusions 
about causal action are subject to significant causal uncertainty. Un-
less the causal system is closed and completely understood, the 
factfinder must decide, explicitly or implicitly, what level of causal un-
certainty is acceptable in the context. Again, such a decision is not 
purely scientific. 
B. Risk Assessment, Scientific Uncertainty, and Science Policies 
Since the 1970s, those involved in health, safety, and environ-
mental regulation have developed a set of methodologies called "risk 
assessment. "22 A risk assessment process attempts to determine which 
2o Sec discussion supra Section II.A.l. 
2! Sec, e.g., jAMES A. DAVIS, Tnt: LoGIC OF CAUSAL ORDER 25-27 (1985). 
22 Sec generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK AssESSMENT IN THE fEDERAL Gov-
t:RNMENT: MANAGING ·m.: PRocEss (1983) [hereinafter NRC (1983)]; NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH CouNCIL, SciENCE AND JunGMENT IN RisK AssESSMENT (1994) [hereinafter NRC 
(1994)]; 1 THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK AssESSMENT AND 
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adverse effects can be caused by exposure to a toxic agent, and the 
probability that such exposure will lead to such effects. 23 Risk assess-
ment, therefore, divides into two major sub-issues: the toxicity of the 
causal agent or hazard, and the predicted exposure to that hazard. 
Toxicity assessment evaluates the qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of the causal relationship between a dose or level of exposure and a 
resulting incidence or severity of adverse effect. 24 Exposure assess-
ment evaluates the probability, magnitude, duration, and timing of 
the doses that target organisms might receive through the various 
pathways of exposure (such as inhalation, ingestion, or dermal ab-
sorption) .25 Total risk increases as either toxicity or potential exposure 
increases. Protective strategies might be to decrease toxicity or expo-
sure, or both. Risk assessment combines toxicity and exposure assess-
ments in order to characterize the total risk posed by some condition 
or event. The purpose of risk assessment is to provide accurate and 
useful risk characterizations to risk managers, who then can decide 
what should or will be done to reduce or manage those risks. 
A significant amount of scientific uncertainty exists within virtu-
ally every risk assessment of any importance. In most cases, there is a 
well-recognized lack of information both about the toxicity of .an 
agent (i.e., the conditions under which exposure to it can cause ad-
verse effects) and about the likelihood of exposure. Scientists do not 
have complete toxicity studies for the vast majority of chemical com-
pounds employed today. Even when toxicity studies do exist, 
significant uncertainties usually remain. For example, even after toxi-
cologists conduct carcinogenicity studies in animals, uncertainties 
remain about whether the test animals are adequate biological models 
for humans; whether there is a no-risk threshold somewhere between 
the high-dose effects observed in the study and the low-dose expo-
sures encountered outside the laboratory; and whether there exists an 
RISK MANAGEMENT, fRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT 
(1997). 
23 This notion of risk assessment is now incorporated into an international treaty. See 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
VVTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--REsULTS OF TilE URUGUAY RouND vol. 
I (1994), available at http:/ I docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
2< See, e.g., NRC (1983), supra note 22, at 19-27; NRC (1994), supra note 22, at 26,57-
66; Commission Directive 93/67, 1993 OJ. (L 227) 9 ("laying down the principles for as-
sessment of risks to man and the environment of substances notified in accordance with 
Council Directive 67 /548/EEC"). 
25 NRC (1983), supra note 22, at 20, 27-28; NRC (1994), supra note 22, at 26-27, 43-
55; Commission Directive 93/67, supra note 24. 
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adequate margin of safety to protect unusually sensitive people?26 
Similarly, even after researchers complete a typical exposure assess-
ment, there may be significant uncertainties about the frequency, 
magnitude, and duration of individual exposures through diet, occu-
pation, and other scenarios. Risk assessors must make decisions about 
how to take into account the vast number of remaining uncertainties, 
even when the available studies are relatively extensive. 27 Despite the 
pervasiveness of scientific uncertainty in risk assessment, the myth of 
science as a "neutral arbiter" about risk often describes the factfinding 
process using the neutral-sounding language of "risk assessment." Risk 
assessments that arrive at findings about risk, however, in the face of 
scientific uncertainty, cannot be purely scientific. 
One important question is who will make those decisions that are 
necessarily inherent but not scientific in nature. One possibility is to 
let scientists make those decisions, despite the fact that the decisions 
are not scientific ones. Individual scientists make many decisions 
about which variables are relevant to a study, how to handle missing 
data, when to make simplifYing assumptions, which mathematical 
models to employ, and so forth. Groups of scientists sometimes estab-
lish conventions for which decisions to make in the face of a com-
monly encountered problem. The convention about an acceptable 
level of statistical significance is one such example. Conventions about 
how to analyze and report experimental results allow subsequent re-
searchers to duplicate previously performed studies, thereby provid-
ing a check on the earlier study's results. Modern science became a 
social endeavor, with powerful epistemic advances, only after meth-
odological norms and conventions created a common enterprise. But 
decisions by scientists to adopt or adhere to a methodological conven-
tion are often merely decisions about how to proceed, not sci-
entifically warranted conclusions about the world. Nevertheless, per-
26 Sec, e.g., Vern R. Walker, Keeping the lVTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organi-
zation": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 
CoRNHI. Iwr'1. LJ. 251,263-66 (1998). 
27 One option for risk assessment scientists, of course, is merely to communicate all of 
the residual uncertain ties to others, and to leave the ultimate task of factfinding about risk 
to those others. I express no opinion here about the advantages and disadvantages of such 
an approach. The analysis here applies to conclusions or findings about the existence or 
non-existence of a triggering risk, regardless of whether scientists or non-scientists make 
those ultimate findings. In addition, the analysis in Section IT of this article applies even to 
findings about causation, which provide the evidentiary grounds for ultimate findings 
about triggering risks. 
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haps the needed decision-making could be left to scientists, especially 
if there were no better alternative. 
An alternative has begun to appear, however, within the risk as-
sessment context. When risk assessors encounter identifiable and re-
current instances of scientific uncertainty, governmental decision-
makers sometimes establish explicit "science policies" for risk asses-
sors to follow.28 Science policies are decision rules about the way in 
which risk assessment scientists should proceed when they encounter 
specified types of uncertainties.29 Science policies direct the choices 
that risk assessors make from among the scientifically plausible as-
sumptions. What makes uncertainty "scientific" is that scientists might 
agree on a number of plausible accounts, but cannot determine 
through scientifically accepted methods which of those plausible ac-
counts will ultimately prove to be the correct one. For example, if no 
data are available for the rate of dermal absorption of a particular 
chemical, then scientists might agree on a plausible range of dermal 
absorption values, but might lack the data to narrow that range fur-
ther. A science policy might then prescribe which of those plausible 
default values to assume (e.g., a particular default value for the rate of 
dermal absorption in adults). Another example is that scientists might 
agree that certain mathematical curves are not plausible candidates 
for characterizing the dose-response function for a particular chemi-
cal, but they might disagree on which of the plausible curves best ap-
proximates the dose-response function. A science policy might then 
direct which curve to employ as a default (e.g., an assumption that 
there is no "safe" or "threshold" dose). 
Such science policies are not themselves scientific conclusions. If 
scientific evidence were able to resolve the uncertainty, there would 
be no need for a science policy. Science policies tell the risk assessor 
how to proceed in a principled way to characterize the total risk, al-
though doing so means reaching conclusions beyond what scientific 
method would warrant. Science policies establish decision rules to 
deal with uncertainties for which scientific conventions do not exist. 
Such policies often pick up where established scientific conventions 
28 See, e.g., EPA, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 
(1986); EPA, Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960 
(1996); NRC (1983), supra note 22; NRC (1994), supra note 22; Walker, supra note 26, at 
258-63. 
29 Science policies are also said to be "inference guidelines" or to result in "default as-
sumptions." See NRC (1983), supra note 22, at 28-37; NRC (1994), supra note 22, at 27,85-
90; EPA, Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, supra note 28, at 17,964. 
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end, and guide risk assessors in situations not covered by established 
conventions. 
But if scientists facing uncertainty make their own assumptions, 
either on an ad hoc basis or by adopting conventions, why should 
administrative agencies establish explicit science policies to govern 
findings about risk, instead of simply "letting scientists do whatever 
scientists do"? Agencies give a number of rationales for adopting ex-
plicit science policies,30 which are mentioned here only briefly. First, 
explicit science policies help findings about risk to be "transparent." 
Explicit science policies for commonly encountered situations of un-
certainty allow everyone, including scientists, regulators, and the po-
tentially affected public, to distinguish the scientifically warranted in-
ferences from the non-scientific decision-making. As a result, the 
scientific basis for the risk characterization is distinct from the policy 
component. Greater transparency creates greater clarity in risk com-
munication, for the acknowledged application of explicit policies by 
factfinders communicates to risk managers and to the general public 
the true mix of science and policy within the risk assessment. 
Second, explicit science policies enable governmental institutions 
to distinguish the proper functions of risk assessors and risk manag-
ers. For example, a science policy might institute a presumption that 
if a compound can cause cancer in test animals, then it can also do so 
in humans. This presumption directs risk assessors to use positive 
animal data to characterize the extent of risk to humans. Such a pol-
icy enables risk assessment scientists to complete risk characterization, 
without the scientists themselves making the non-scientific decisions 
underlying those findings. At the same time, the existence of an ex-
plicit science policy helps to ensure that risk managers (not scientists) 
will make the decisions underlying the science policies, and that those 
decisions will receive appropriate policy justifications. The use of ex-
plicit science policies allows all participants and affected parties to 
distinguish the two activities of scientific inference and non-scientific 
decision-making, and encourages everyone to evaluate science as sci-
ence and policy as policy. Scientists and scientific communities sel-
dom attempt to justify their conventions on the basis of policies. Gov-
ernmental institutions, by contrast, are more likely to recognize 
default rules as being decisions that require justification-by appeal, 
30 Sec, e.g., EPA, Memorandum: EPA Risk Characterization Program (1995); EPA, Pol-
icy for Risk Characterization ( 1995); EPA, Science Policy Council, Guidance for Risk Char-
acterization (1995); Walker, supra note 26, at 260-62. 
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for example, to the desirability of the consequences, the effectiveness 
of the rule on the whole, the fairness of the approach, and the equity 
and efficiency of following the same rule in all similar cases. 
Third, making science policies explicit increases the likelihood of 
uniformity between one finding of risk and another, regardless of dif-
ferences in the regulatory context. To the extent that all risk assessors 
make the same default inferences when faced with similar circum-
stances of uncertainty, potentially affected parties can be more 
confident that the findings rest on comparable assumptions and deci-
sions. This also allows meaningful comparisons among risk findings 
and a common basis for setting priorities. Achieving uniformity also 
serves non-epistemic goals of governance, such as the equitable 
treatment of potentially affected parties. When decision-makers 
bridge gaps in knowledge by instituting explicit science policies, they 
acknowledge that what they are doing is not "pure science" at all, but 
rather decision-making in the service of regulatory objectives. 
III. EXAMPLES OF TRIGGERING FINDINGS ABOUT RISK 
This section discusses a variety of findings about risk from the law 
of the United States, the European Community, and international 
trade law. These findings are used to trigger or justify the taking of 
precautions in a variety of areas. These examples are discussed here 
only briefly, to illustrate the non-scientific decisions involved in mak-
ing such findings. This discussion does not evaluate the strength of 
evidence for any particular finding in any particular case. 
A. Examples of Food Safety T1iggers in the United States 
Under the food safety law of the United States, a number of fac-
tual situations can trigger precautionary measures.31 The Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) is the cornerstone statute, 
and is oriented toward ensuring that food is "safe."32 Any marketed 
food33 is subject to enforcement or regulation if it bears or contains a 
substance that is "poisonous or deleterious" and that substance "may 
31 For a more complete review of food safety law from the standpoint of taking precau-
tions, see Vern R. Walker, Some Dangers of Taking Precautions Without Adopting the Precaution-
ary Principle: A Critique of Food Safety Regulation in the United States, 31 ENVrL. L. REP. 10040 
(2001). 
32 21 u.s.c. § 342 (2000). 
33 The word "marketed" here refers to any acts that are prohibited under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 331. 
2003] Neutral Arbiter for T1iggering Precautions 217 
render" the food "injurious to health. "34 Moreover, if a substance that 
is "poisonous or deleterious" is "added to" the food, then the food is 
subject to enforcement or regulation under certain conditions.35 
These triggering predicates require non-scientific decisions about 
their meaning. First, the statutory words "poisonous or deleterious" 
and "injurious to health" have narrower meanings than the word 
"harm" used in Section I above. Some kinds of harm might not serve 
as triggers under particular sections of the FFDCA, such as economic 
harm (e.g., food that is too expensive) or aesthetic harm (e.g., food 
that appears unappetizing).36 Moreover, there is a threshold of de 
minimis "risk" to be determined, at least for natural substances that 
are not "added to" food. Even if such a substance is "poisonous or 
deleterious," there must be a finding that its presence may render the 
food itself "injurious to health." The food cannot be considered adul-
terated "if the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordi-
narily render it injurious to health. "37 Second, the statutory language 
displays various modalities, from the subjunctive verb "may render" to 
the indicative "does not ordinarily render." 
The statutory dichotomy between "safe" and "unsafe" takes on 
more precise meanings in other statutory requirements, administra-
tive rules, and judicial decisions. Congress itself has determined that 
certain categories of substances in food are "unsafe" unless proven to 
be safe: pesticide chemical residues,38 food additives,39 color addi-
34 Id. § 342(a)(l). 
35 Id. §§ 342(a)(2)(A), 346. 
36 See, e.g., United States v. 449 Cases Containing "Tomato Paste," 212 F.2d 567, 569-73 
(2d Cir. 1954) (surveying various factual predicates that serve as regulatory triggers under 
the FFDCA); United States v. 24 Cases, More or Less, 87 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D. Me. 1949) 
(holding, in a libel in rem proceeding relating to cases of canned herring roe, that "in 
order for a product to be subject to condemnation as unfit for food, on account of it's 
[sic] tough and rubbery consistency, the product must be proved to be so tough and rub-
bery that the average, normal person, under ordinary conditions, would not chew and 
swallow it"). 
37 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1); 21 C.F.R. §§ 109.3(c), (d) (2000). Cf PETER BARTON HuTT & 
RICHARD A. MERRILL, FooD AND DRUG LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 948-50 (2d ed. 1991) 
(carcinogenic natural foods and ingredients). 
38 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(q), 342(a)(2)(8), 346a(a)(1). The statute declares any pesticide 
chemical residue in or on a food to be "unsafe" unless its use conforms to a regulatory 
tolerance or an exemption. ld. §§ 342(a) (2) (8), 346a(a). 
39 21 U.S.C. §§ 321 (s), 342(a) (2) (C) (i), 348(a). The statute declares any food additive 
(other than a food contact substance) to be "unsafe" unless its use conforms to an exemp-
tion or a use regulation. ld. §§ 342(a) (2) (C) (i), 348(a). 
A precondition for being a "food additive" is that the substance not be "generally rec-
ognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its 
safety, as having been adequately shown ... to be safe under the conditions of its intended 
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tives,40 and new animal drugs or conversion products of new animal 
drugs.41 Congress has determined that there is an unacceptable risk in 
putting such substances into the food chain without pre-marketing 
approval.42 The pre-marketing requirements generally consist of pro-
ducing required types of evidence of safety and persuading the rele-
vant agency that any existing risk of harm is acceptable. For example, 
in order for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to approve 
color additives as "safe," the agency requires "convincing evidence 
that establishes with reasonable certainty that no harm will result from 
the intended use."43 The administrative definition of "safe" for food 
additives is similar: "safe ... means that there is a reasonable certainty 
in the minds of competent scientists that the substance is not harmful 
under the intended conditions of use. "44 The wording of these 
findings displays the various elements that require non-scientific deci-
sions: the meaning of the categorical predicate "harm," and the risk 
of such harm posed by "intended use"; the seemingly conservative 
modifiers "no harm" and "not harmful"; and the probabilistic modal-
ity indicated by "reasonable certainty." Moreover, the agency clearly 
use"-that is, that the substance is not "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS). /d.§ 321 (s). 
Being GRAS is therefore based on "scientific procedures"-unless the substance was used 
in food prior to 1958, in which case an alternative basis is "experience based on common 
use in food." ld. If a substance is GRAS, then it is not a food additive and does not trigger 
the pre-marketing approval required for food additives. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(g) (2000). 
40 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(t), 342(c), 379e(a). The statute declares any color additive to be 
"unsafe" unless its use conforms to a use regulation or an exemption. /d. §§ 342(c), 
379e(a). 
41 /d.§§ 321(v), 342(a)(2)(C)(ii), 360b(a). The statute declares any new animal drug 
to be "unsafe" unless its use conforms to an approved application. !d.§§ 342(a) (2) (C) (ii), 
360b(a) (1). Excluded from this category are drugs "generally recognized ... as safe and 
effective" by qualified experts and other "grandfathered" drugs. See id. § 321 (v). 
42 Other pre-marketing triggers also exist, such as the inspection-and-condemnation 
provisions for meat and meat food products, poultry products, and egg products. !d. 
§§ 601 ff, 610(c)(2), 451 ff, 458(a)(2)(B), 1031 ff, 1037(b)(2). For such products, inspec-
tion measures are triggered categorically for the relevant animals or products, or for estab-
lishments that process them. See, e.g., id. §§ 455, 603, 604, 608, 1034. If the required inspec-
tion results in an administrative determination that a particular product is "adulterated," 
then that product can be condemned and destroyed. See, e.g., id. §§ 604, 672, 673, 455(c), 
467a, 467b, 1034(c), 1048, 1049. The relevant agency also has the authority to prosecute 
judicial proceedings, and the court may condemn and seize any covered product that is 
found to be adulterated and capable of being used as human food. See, e.g., id. 
§§610(c)(1), 673(a)(1)(B), 458(a)(2)(A), 467b(a)(1)(B). "Adulteration" is generally 
defined as bearing or containing any poisonous or deleterious substance that may render 
the product either injurious to health or unfit for human food. See, e.g., id. §§ 601 (m), 
453(g), 1033(a). 
43 21 C.F.R. § 70.3(i) (2000). 
44 /d.§ 170.3(i). 
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opens the way for placing requirements on supporting evidence 
through the phrases "convincing evidence" and "reasonable certainty 
in the minds of competent scientists." The language suggests that 
such findings are purely scientific in nature, when demonstrably they 
are not. 
The non-scientific nature of such findings becomes more clear 
when factfinders decide that low levels of risk are so acceptable that 
they determine the food to be "safe." Under the traditional approach 
for adverse health effects other than cancer, when scientific evidence 
from animal studies indicates that there exists a threshold dose for 
adverse effects, risk managers have adopted policies for acceptable 
margins of safety.45 Generally, they have decided that a factor of 100 
provides a margin of safety that makes any remaining risk acceptable. 
That is, a substance that is harmful to animals at doses only above a 
"no-adverse-effect level" has been considered "safe" for humans (in 
the statutory meaning of "safe") at doses less than 1/100th of that 
animal no-adverse-effect level. 46 When the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) assesses the risk of pesticide chemical residues, how-
ever, Congress requires the EPA to adopt "an additional tenfold mar-
gin of safety" specifically for infants and children.47 As a result, the 
margins of safety normally applied to non-carcinogenic effects studied 
with animal data may be different for pesticide residues (1/1000) 
than they are for food or color additives (1/100), at least when infants 
and children might be exposed.48 Using a specific safety factor for a 
particular regulatory category is a risk management decision and cer-
tainly not a conclusion of pure science. 
45 Sec Final OECD-U.S. Summary Precaution Annex, Precaution in U.S. Food Safety Deci-
siomnaking: Annex II to the U.S. National Food Safety System Paper (Mar. 2000), §§ B.1, B.3 & 
, 82 [hereinafter Precaution Annex]. 
46 The normally applied safety factor for a color additive is "1/100th of the maximum 
no-effect level for the most susceptible experimental animals tested." 21 C.F.R. § 70.40 
(2000). The tolerance for a food additive usually will not exceed "1/100th of the maxi-
mum amount demonstrated to be without harm to experimental animals." !d. § 170.22. 
The requirement to consider "safety factors" for food and color additives is statutory. 21 
U.S.C. §§ 348(c) (5) (C), 379e(b) (5) (A) (iii). For similar use of a 100-fold safety factor by 
EPA in setting tolerance levels for pesticide residues, see H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. 2, at 
41 (1996). 
47 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (2) (C). EPA is authorized to "use a different margin of safety for 
the pesticide chemical residue only if, on the basis of reliable data, such margin will be safe 
for infants and children." /d. 
48 Compare note 46 supra with 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (2) (C); see H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. 
2, at 41, 43 ( 1996); Frank B. Cross, The Consequences of Consensus: Dangerous Compromises of 
the Food Quality Protection Act, 75 \VASil. U .L.Q. 1155, 1166-67 ( 1997). 
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The regulation of carcinogens in U.S. food law provides further 
examples of non-scientific decision-making at both the legislative and 
administrative levels. Congress has enacted three "Delaney Clauses" 
that create a "per se risk management law"49 for carcinogenic sub-
stances in three categories: food additives,50 color additives,51 and new 
animal drugs.52 If a food additive, for example, is found to induce 
cancer when ingested by animals, then the FDA has no discretion to 
approve that additive as safe.53 During the 1980s, the FDA and the 
EPA tried to adopt more relaxed interpretations of the Delaney 
Clauses, but with limited success.54 The FDA implemented a policy 
that a food or color additive containing a carcinogenic chemical "con-
stituent" does not necessarily trigger the Delaney Clause, and the 
safety of the additive as a whole is determined under the general 
safety clause.55 However, courts generally considered the language 
and intent of Congress in the Delaney Clauses to be clear and refused 
to allow relaxed administrative interpretations. 56 In 1996, partly as a 
result of a judicial decision involving pesticide residues,57 Congress 
changed the level of protection for carcinogenic pesticide chemical 
49 Precaution Annex, supra note 45, at,, 87-92. 
5o 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (3) (A). 
51 !d.§ 379e(b)(5)(B). 
52 !d.§ 360b(d) (1) (1). 
53 See Precaution Annex, supra note 45, ,, 87, 89. Because a food ingredient that is 
GRAS does not fall within the definition of "food additive," it is not technically subject to 
the Delaney Clause. HuTT & MERRILL, supra note 37, at 338. Moreover, the Delaney 
Clauses are not triggered unless the agency makes several determinations that normally 
involve science policies. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 70.50 (2000) (color additives). 
54 Congress can, of course, exempt food products from the Delaney Clause prohibi-
tions, as it did in the case of saccharin. See HuTT & MERRILL, supra note 37, at 922-28. 
55 See FDA, Policy for Regulating Carcinogenic Chemicals in Food and Color Additives, 
4 7 Fed. Reg. 14,464 (Food & Drug Admin., Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Apr. 
2, 1982); Scott v. FDA, 728 F.2d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding FDA's determination 
that the color additive as a whole did not cause cancer in test animals, although the p-
toluidine present in minute quantities is carcinogenic when tested separately). Between 
the Scott decision and 1990, FDA approved more than thirty color additives and indirect 
food additives containing a variety of trace carcinogenic constituents. HU'IT & MERRILL, 
supra note 37, at 922. 
56 Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. 
Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Ass'n v. Pub. Citizen, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988) (rejecting 
FDA's de minimis re-interpretation of the color additives Delaney Clause); Les v. Reilly, 968 
F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Nat'l Agric. Chems. Ass'n v. Les, 507 U.S. 
950 (1993) (rejecting EPA's de minimis re-interpretation of the food additives Delaney 
Clause, in a case involving carcinogenic pesticides that concentrated during processing 
and therefore became food additives in processed food under the FFDCA as it was then 
written). 
57 Les v. Reilly, supra note 56. 
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residues from the zero tolerance of the Delaney Clauses to "a reason-
able certainty that no harm will result. "58 This statutory standard ap-
pears to track the FDA's administrative definitions of "safe" for color 
additives and food additives, and the logical analysis above of the ad-
ministrative definition applies to the statutory wording as well.59 In 
the case of carcinogens, Congress expected this level of protection to 
be a lifetime risk no greater than one in one million, calculated using 
conservative assumptions.60 When qualitative evidence shows that a 
substance can cause cancer in animals at high doses, the decision that 
a specific low dose is "safe" for humans (using the statutory meaning 
of "safe") is a decision of risk management, not a conclusion of pure 
science. 
B. ExamjJles of Risk Tliggers in the European Community 
Two recent decisions by the European Court of First Instance 
provide examples of risk triggers within European Community law. 
The cases involved judicial review of withdrawals of Community 
authorization for two antibiotics as additives in animal feed: virginia-
mycin, at issue in Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council,61 and bacitracin 
zinc, at issue in Alphanna Inc. v. Council.62 These decisions are part of 
the European Community's evolving law on its precautionary princi-
58 See Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. no. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489, 1514-
35, § 405 [hereinafter FQPA]; 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii); H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. I 
at 36, pt. 2 at 40 (1996); Cross, supra note 48, at 1160-62. Under the prior law, pesticide 
residues that concentrated in food processing triggered the regulatory provisions for food 
additives, including the food additive Delaney Clause; see Les v. Reilly, supra note 56. 
59 See supm text accompanying notes 43-44; Cross, supra note 48, at 1162-63. 
60 See H.R. REP. No. 104-669, pt. 2, at 41 (1996), which states: 
In the case of a non threshold effect which can be assessed through quantita-
tive risk assessment, such as a cancer effect, the Committee expects, based on 
its understanding of current EPA practice, that a tolerance will be considered 
to provide a "reasonable certainty of no harm" if any increase in lifetime risk, 
based on quantitative risk assessment using conservative assumptions, will be 
no greater than "negligible." It is the Committee's understanding that, under 
current EPA practice, ... EPA interprets a negligible risk to be a one-in-a-
million lifetime risk. The Committee expects the Administrator to continue 
to follow this interpretation. 
/d. See Cross, supra note 48, at 1164-65. This quantitath·e level of protection of one in one 
million is precisely the risk that FDA had announced to be negligible or de minimis. See e.g., 
HuTT & MERRILL, supra note 37, at 899-904; Pub. Citizen v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 364, 365 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
61 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA/NV v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II_ (2002). 
62 Case T-70/99, Alpharma, Inc. v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II_ (2002). 
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pie and contain one approach to findings that trigger application of 
this principle.63 Therefore, while the two cases deal with withdrawals 
of authorization for additives in animal feed, the interpretive ap-
proach probably applies to a much wider array of legal contexts. 
Both the Pfizer and Alpharma cases reviewed a regulation adopted 
by the Council of the European Union64 that withdrew authorization 
pursuant to Council Directive 70/524/EEC (as amended) 65 which is 
founded in turn on Community authority over a common agricultural 
policy.66 Article 3 of that Directive requires that "no additive may be 
put into circulation unless a Community authorization has been 
granted" by the European Commission.67 The Council found additives 
in animal feed to pose sufficient generic risk, such that marketing ad-
ditives ("putting them in to circulation") is unlawful without pre-
marketing approval. Article 3a states five necessary conditions that 
must be met before Community authorization will be given. The fol-
lowing two necessary conditions are of interest here: 
(b) taking account of the conditions of use, it [the additive] 
does not adversely affect human or animal health or the en-
vironment, nor harm the consumer by impairing the charac-
teristics of animal products; ... 
(e) for serious reasons concerning human or animal health 
its use must not be restricted to medical or veterinary pur-
poses. 
Once authorization for an additive has been given, various proce-
dures govern withdrawing that authorization-provided either by Ar-
63 For discussions of that evolving law, see, e.g., Theofanis Christoforou, The Origins, 
Content and Rok of the Precautionary Principk in European Community Law, in LE PRINCIPE DE 
PRECAUTION: AsPECTS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMMUNAUTAIRE 205-30 (Charles 
Leben & Joe Verhoeven eds., 2002); Theofanis Christoforou, The Precautionary Principk, 
Risk Assessment, and the Comparative Rok of Science in the European Community and the United 
States Legal Systems, in GREEN GIANTS? ENVIRONMENTAL PoLICY OF TilE UNITED STATES AND 
TIIE EuROPEAN UNION (N. Vig and M. Faure eds.) (forthcoming 2003). 
64 Council Regulation 2821/98, 1998 OJ. (L 351). 
65 Alpharma, 2002 E.C.R. II _, n 3-6, 17-20, 83, 93-95; Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II _, 
n 3-6, 17-19,91, IOI-o3. 
66 TREATY ESTABLISHING TilE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 37, Nov 10, 1997 OJ. (C 
340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]; Alpharma, 2002 E.C.R. II_, 'l[ 132; Pfizer, 2002 
E.C.R. II_, 'l[ Ill. 
67 Council Directive 70/524/EEC, art. 3, 1970 OJ. (L 270). 
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tides 11 and 24 (applicable in the Pfizer case)68 or by Article 23 (appli-
cable in the Alpharma case).69 
The two cases involved similar findings for triggering a ban (i.e., 
for withdrawal of authorization) and a similar evidentiary warrant for 
those findings. At issue was whether use of these two antibiotics in 
animal feed increases the risk of microbial resistance to antibiotics 
used in humans. In the Pfizer case, for example, Pfizer did not dispute 
that, in principle, precautionary measures could be triggered by a 
warranted finding that the use of virginiamycin as a growth promoter 
in animal feed "involves a risk of a transfer of antimicrobial resistance 
from animals to humans .... "70 Pfizer argued that the scientific evi-
dence available to the Community institutions did not warrant such a 
finding. 71 The European Commission had found, however, that with-
drawal of authorization was necessary to ensure the protection of 
human health.72 The Council determined that there was a "risk that 
the effectiveness of certain human medicinal products might be re-
duced or even eliminated as a result of the use of virginiamycin. "73 
Mter reviewing the record, the Court held that there was adequate 
scientific evidence available at the time the regulation was adopted to 
support the Council's finding "that the use of virginiamycin as an ad-
ditive in feedingstuffs entailed a risk to human health."74 
These cases illustrate the role of non-scientific decision-making in 
finding a risk that triggers taking precautions. Directive 70/524/EEC 
permits withdrawal of authorization for an additive if its use "consti-
tutes a danger to ... human health" and withdrawal is "necessary ... 
to ensure the protection of human ... health. "75 The Court inter-
preted this as meaning a "risk" to human health and defined "risk" as 
"the possibility that the use of [the additive] will give rise to adverse 
effects on human health .... "76 The relevant "harm" is therefore 
broadly defined as being any adverse effect on health. Moreover, a 
"risk" is a "possibility" that use can cause an adverse effect. The Court 
elsewhere called this a "possible link" between use and adverse ef-
68 Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II_, t1 91, 101-03, 112. 
69 Alpharma, 2002 E.C.R. II_, n 83, 93-95. 
7o Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II_, 1 126. 
71 /d., I27. 
72 Id. 1 II2; Council Directive 70/524/EEC, supra note 67, art. 1I (3). 
73 Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II_, 1 II2. 
74 !d. 1 40I; sec id. n 3I5-22, 359-61, 393. 
75 Sec Council Directi\'e 70/524/EEC, supra note 67, art. II (I), (3). 
76 Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II_, 1 I38. 
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feet, 77 or a capability of causing an adverse effect. 78 As for the modifier 
on the required risk, any finding of "a risk to human health" will do.79 
As for the modality of the finding, the risk cannot be "purely hypo-
thetical" or "mere conjecture, "80 but it does not have to be "fully ap-
parent"81 or "fully demonstrated. "82 Finally, the Court gave consider-
able deference to the Council and Commission on when the available 
evidence is "adequate. "83 The scientific evidence does not need to be 
of the highest methodological quality,84 specific to actual antibiotic 
use as an additive,85 complete,86 or conclusive.87 With such low 
thresholds on virtually all of the logical aspects of a triggering finding 
of risk, it is no surprise that the Court upheld taking the very conser-
vative precaution of banning the previously authorized antibiotics. 
This approach to a finding of risk is consistent with the approach 
taken by the European Commission in its "Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle. "88 In that Communication, the Commission 
gave the following informal statement of a typical triggering situation: 
[ w] hen there are reasonable grounds for concern that po-
tential hazards may affect the environment or human, ani-
mal or plant health, and when at the same time the available 
data preclude a detailed risk evaluation, the precautionary 
77 /d., 312-24, 342-401. 
78 !d., 147, 165. 
79 !d., 401. 
so Id., 143. 
81 Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II_,, 140. 
82 !d., 139, 141, 146, 360, 379, 384-87, 388. 
85 !d. ,, 144, 161, 168, 323, 389, 393. The following finding by the Court suggests a 
large number of focal points for non-scientific decisions: 
[T)he Court finds that the Community institutions did not exceed the 
bounds of the discretion conferred on them by the Treaty when they took the 
view that the various experiments and observations referred to in ... the con-
tested regulation were not mere conjecture but amounted to sufficiently reli-
able and cogent scientific evidence for them to conclude that there was a 
proper scientific basis for a possible link between the use of virginiamycin as 
an additive in feedingstuffs and the development of streptogramin resistance 
in humans. 
!d., 389. 
84 /d., 371-76, 379-80, 382-83, 388. 
811 Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II_,,, 354, 370. 
86 !d., 160-62, 382-83. 
87 !d. , 382-83. 
88 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000) 
1, 2-4 [hereinafter Communication). 
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principle has been politically accepted as a risk management 
strategy in several fields.s9 
225 
This statement displays the various non-scientific aspects discussed in 
Sections I and II of this article. It allows for a variety of meanings for 
"harm" (using the phrase "may affect the environment or human, animal 
or plant health") and a minimal meaning for "risk" ("concern that poten-
tial hazards may affect"), as well as a very weak modality ("may af-
fect"). It requires "reasonable grounds" in the available scientific evi-
dence, but recognizes that the evidence may not be the best possible 
evidence ("the available data preclude a detailed risk evaluation"). It 
leaves open questions about how specific, adequate, or methodologi-
cally sound that evidence must be. The Pfizer and Alphanna cases show 
that finding a triggering risk involves non-scientific decisions about 
acceptable levels of uncertainty about risk.9° Although the Commis-
sion's Communication admits that the potential consequences of in-
action in the face of risk are factors in triggering recourse to the pre-
cautionary principle,91 it stops short of acknowledging the consid-
erable role of non-scientific decision-making in determining risk.92 
Nevertheless, from invocations of the precautionary principle in prac-
tice, it is clear that non-scientific decision-making plays an essential 
role in finding a triggering risk. 
C. Examples of Risk Tliggers in World Trade 01ganization Disputes 
Decisions by international tribunals adjudicating trade disputes 
further illustrate triggering findings of risk. The Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment),93 administered by the WTO, requires WTO members to "en-
sure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the 
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is 
89 /d. at 9. Another statement of trigger in the Communication is: "The precautionary 
principle is relevant only in the event of a potential risk, even if this risk cannot be fully 
demonstrated or quantified or its effects determined because of the insufficiency or in-
conclush·e nature of the scientific data." /d. at 13. 
90 In addition to the discussion above, see Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II_, 1 153. 
91 There was the possibility of irreversible harm at stake in Pfizer and Alpharma. See 
Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II_,~ 334. 
92 The Commission acknowledges that in the face of scientific uncertainty, risk assess-
ment itself can take a "prudential approach" and incorporate prudential aspects, but 
seems ambivalent about calling this risk management. See Communication, supra note 88, 
at 12. The better approach is to state clearly that science policies for risk assessors are risk 
management decisions and that findings of risk are not purely scientific. 
93 SPS Agreement, supra note 23. 
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based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence. "94 In addition, "[m]embers shall ensure that their 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, asap-
propriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant 
life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques devel-
oped by the relevant international organizations. "95 The phrase "sani-
tary or phytosanitary measure" refers to any governmental action that 
is designed to protect against any "risks" that are covered by the SPS 
Agreement.96 Taken together, these provisions require, among other 
things, that a warranted finding of a relevant risk is required in order 
to justify the application of any precautionary measure covered by the 
Agreement. 
The SPS Agreement clearly distinguishes between assessing a risk 
and deciding what to do about a risk once it is found, although the 
Agreement itself refers only to "risk assessment" and not to "risk man-
agement. "97 Under the Agreement, a WfO member is entitled to se-
lect any level of protection that it considers "appropriate" for its terri-
tory and can establish protective measures to achieve that level of 
protection.98 This is another way of saying that each member can de-
cide what level of risk is acceptable.99 Such decisions are sovereign 
acts of government, at least as long as they are internally consistent 
and employ only justifiable distinctions. 100 The focus of this article, 
however, is not on the range of management options permitted under 
the SPS Agreement, but on the non-scientific aspects of risk findings 
that can trigger legitimate management precautions. 
The Meat Hormones case involved a dispute under the SPS 
Agreement over a European ban on imports of meat and meat prod-
ucts derived from cattle to which certain hormones had been admin-
94 ld. art. 2.2. 
95 ld. art. 5.1. 
96/d. annex A.l. For example, a "sanitary or phytosanitary measure" might be a gov-
ernmental measure applied "to protect human or animal life or health within the territory 
of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing 
organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs." ld. annex A.1 (b). Thus, the SPS Agreement 
applies to health risks from food and animal feed. 
97 WfO, Appellate Body, Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), Wf/DS26/ AB/R & Wf/DS48/ AB/R, , 181 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter 
Hormones Report]. 
98 SPS Agreement, supra note 23, pmble., arts. 2.1, 3.3, 5, annex A.5. 
99 See id. annex A.5; Communication, supra note 88, § 5.2.1. 
IOO See, e.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 23, art. 5.5, annex A.5; Walker, supra note 26, at 
268-71. 
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istered for growth promotion purposes.1°1 The legitimacy of such a 
ban under the Agreement depends upon a finding that such products 
pose a relevant risk of harm. Under the SPS Agreement, the meaning 
of harm is broad, covering "human or animal life or health. "102 The 
covered "risks" in the case were those "arising from additives, con-
taminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or 
feedstuffs. "103 The Appellate Body held that the risk assessment re-
quired under the Agreement needs to address the "potential for ad-
verse effects," and that "potential" here means "possibility," not 
"probability. "104 There is no minimum quantitative threshold of risk 
required, and finding a risk to exist is consistent with deciding to 
adopt a level of protection of "zero risk. "1°5 Moreover, the modality of 
the finding is that the risk must be "ascertainable": not so uncertain as 
to be "theoretical," but not so certain as to provide "absolute cer-
tainty."106 As for evidentiary warrant, the Appellate Body held that the 
precautionary measure must be "sufficiently supported or reasonably 
warranted" by the risk assessment. 107 In addition, the supporting sci-
entific evidence must be "sufficiently specific" to the risk posed by 
"the residues of those hormones found in meat derived from cattle to 
which the hormones had been administered for growth promotion 
purposes, "108 although it need not be quantitative1°9 or represent a 
consensus view among scientists.I1° 
A second case under the SPS Agreement, the Australian Salmon 
case, involved a dispute over an Australian prohibition on the impor-
tation of fresh, chilled, or frozen salmon.111 The relevant "harm" at 
issue was the spread of pests or disease within Australia's territory, and 
the biological and economic consequences.112 As decided in the Meat 
Hormones case above, any risk found must be "ascertainable," not 
JOJ Hormones Report, supra note 97, 'll 2. 
I02 SPS Agreement, supra note 23, annex A.l (b). 
103 /d. 
104 Hormones Report, supra note 97, 'l'lf182-84; SPS Agreement, supra note 23, annex 
A.4. 
105 Hormones Report, supra note 97, 1 186; WTO, Appellate Body, Report on Austra-
lia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT /DS18/ AB/R, 'I 125 (Oct. 20, 1998) 
[hereinafter Salmon Report]. 
Jos Hormones Report, supra note 97, 'll 186. 
107 !d. n 186. 193. 
108 /d.n 187,198-201. 
109fd.1 187. 
110 Sec id. 'I 194. 
Ill Salmon Report, supra note 105, 'lll. 
112 /d. 1'1112, 121; SPS Agreement, supra note 23, annex A.1 (a). 
228 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 26:197 
merely "theoretical," and the measure must be reasonably based on a 
risk assessment.l 13 Under the circumstances of the Australian Salmon 
case, however, an adequate risk assessment must evaluate the "likeli-
hood" or "probability" of the entry, establishment, or spread of dis-
ease, not merely the "possibility" of entry, establishment, or spread.114 
Such evidence can be either quantitative or qualitative, 115 and need 
not be complete.ll6 
As this brief discussion demonstrates, the interpretation of the 
SPS Agreement by the Appellate Body illustrates all of the points of 
non-scientific decision-making discussed in this article. Non-scientific 
decisions are inherent in the findings about risk needed to justifY pre-
cautionary measures under the SPS Agreement. 
CoNCLUSION 
There is an unfortunate myth that science can serve as a "neutral 
arbiter" for triggering precautionary measures. Numerous non-scien-
tific decisions are necessarily involved in both making and warranting 
findings that a triggering risk exists. Making a finding of risk involves 
decisions about the meaning of "risk of harm," about the meaning of 
any qualitative or quantitative modifiers, and about the truth modality 
of (or degree of confidence in) the finding as a whole. Moreover, 
every determination that the available scientific evidence warrants a 
finding of risk involves decisions about the acceptable degree of vari-
ous types of uncertainty: conceptual uncertainty, measurement uncer-
tainty, sampling uncertainty, modeling uncertainty, and causal uncer-
tainty. All of these decisions may be made case-by-case, or by applying 
decision rules (science policies) to similar types of cases. This article 
has provided a variety of examples from the food safety law of the 
United States, from recent animal feed cases in the European Com-
munity, and from Appellate Body decisions in WfO trade disputes. If 
the myth of science as a "neutral arbiter" for triggering precautions 
were harmless, indulging in it might not be dangerous. But the myth 
is not harmless if it leads to the wrong people making non-scientific 
decisions through the wrong processes and on the wrong bases. Find-
ing a risk that triggers precautions cannot be a purely scientific act, 
notwithstanding the myth that a "value-neutral" science can do so. 
113 Salmon Report, supra note 105, 'l[ 125. 
114 !d. 'll 123. 
115 !d. , 125. 
116 !d. 'll 130. 
